One piece of this backlash was directed at Keynesian economics-not at any of the fancy stuff, but at the most elementary ideas. Keynesian teaching in textbooks since the 1940s has held that both monetary stimulus (lower interest rates, more money creation) and fiscal stimulus (tax cuts, government spending) can mitigate recessions. Many Keynesian economists, including me, go on to the normative position that central banks and governments should use monetary and fiscal policies for this purpose. And in this particular mega-recession, countries all over the world did stimulate their economies, to good effect. stimulus as inadequate. But it was large by any historical standard. 9 Because of the stimulus and the huge recession, the federal fiscal deficit rocketed to about 10 percent of GDP-a shockingly large number for the USA. And largely because of that huge deficit, a severe political backlash against "deficit spending"
(but perhaps not against tax cuts) developed and, more or less, took over the fiscal policy debate in the U.S.-which by 2010 was focused on reducing the deficit. By 2013, the fiscal drag was extreme, perhaps in the range of 2 percentage points of GDP growth.
8 For example, a Pew (2010) poll in 2010 found that only 34% of Americans (34%) said the TARP was enacted under President Bush administration; 47% said it was passed under President Obama. 9 Krugman's point is that the need was huge. The stimulus was not large enough to fill the entire GDP gap.
The Fed, for its part, pulled out all the stops. After some initial hesitancy, it dropped the federal funds rate to near zero by December 2008 and then turned to a variety of "unconventional" monetary policies like massive lending, quantitative easing, and explicit forward guidance. As noted, the size of the Fed's balance sheet rose by about a factor of five. Even more stunningly, banks' holdings of excess reserves-which, textbooks teach, are normally zero-skyrocketed from about zero when Lehman failed to about $800 billion soon thereafter and eventually to an astounding $2.6 trillion.
As all this was happening, critics began warning-even while the crisis was still white hot-that such hyper-expansionary monetary policies sowed the seeds of future inflation. Some of the criticisms reflected abysmal ignorance. For example, strident objectors to "big government" seemed just to discover that the Fed had enormous discretionary power to "create money"--and they didn't like that. But other criticisms, such as those from Allan Meltzer (2009) and John Taylor (2009) , hardly reflected ignorance.
These and other experts urged the Fed to cease and desist from its extraordinary efforts to fight the Great Recession.
All of this adds up to a very big deal--indeed, to several very big deals: earth-shattering economic events, stupendously large and sometimes innovative policy responses, and a severe backlash that altered the US political landscape for years to come. Hmm. Sounds a bit like the Great Depression and the New Deal. But while the Depression led to both a revolution in economic thinking and a host of huge institutional and legal changes (the FDIC, the SEC, Glass-Steagall...), the Great Recession has not.
It would be unfair (and inaccurate) to say that economics hasn't changed at all. There have been, for example, more papers on bank crises, credit constrictions, moral hazard, a shortage of safe assets, too big to fail, and the like. The insightful work of Hyman Minsky, long forgotten, has been remembered. On the policy and institutional front, we now have a Financial Stability Oversight Council to guard against systemic risk and the Consumer Financial Protection Board to protect consumers from financial chicanery-plus many other changes in the Dodd Frank Act of 2010. Yet this all seems like small beer compared to the intellectual ferment and policy revolution that followed 1929.
Some lessons for economists
Any manageable list of lessons that have been or should have been learned from the crisis and its aftermath must by necessity be both selective and subjective. Mine is no exception. For the sake of tidiness, I break it into two parts, starting with intellectual lessons for professional economists (this section), and then proceeding to lessons for teaching economics (Section 3).
Lesson # 1: It can happen here.
My macroeconomic childhood began with the New Frontier, and with assurances (in Paul
Samuelson's textbook and elsewhere) that institutional changes like deposit insurance and automatic stabilizers, plus the new-found Keynesian wisdom, meant that nothing remotely close to the Great Depression would ever happen again. Recessions sure, but relatively mild and relatively brief onesnothing like the Great Contraction (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) . Would that it were so. The U.S. unemployment rate has reached or topped 10 percent twice since 1980; we narrowly escaped Great Depression 2.0 in 2008-2009; and several presumably "advanced" nations (e.g., Spain, Greece,...) have experienced depression-sized GDP contractions and increases in unemployment.
Other "impossible" things have also happened. Sharp housing bubbles and crashes were supposed to be only local-market events, but in the 2000s we suffered through a nationwide boom-bust cycle.
Financial system meltdowns were supposed to happen only in less-developed countries with weak financial institutions and inadequate regulation, yet the US narrowly escaped experiencing one in 2008.
Deep recessions are supposed to presage sharp recoveries, but that didn't happen after 2009. As noted earlier, the U.S. federal budget deficit reached heights (10 percent of GDP) reminiscent of Argentina.
And, of course, the Federal Reserve not only hit the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (in December 2008), but has been stuck there ever since.
Whatever "it" is, it seems to have happened here. Who can now say such things can't happen again?
Lesson # 2: Minsky was basically right.
For decades, equilibrium paradigms and, especially, rational expectations (RE) and the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) dominated economists' thinking about financial markets. But what I now call a "Reinhart-Rogoff recession" seems to be a creature of a different sort. 10 In addition to being deeper and longer, Reinhart-Rogoff recessions destroy parts of the financial system and leave much of the rest reeling-and needing to deleverage. All of that stunts and delays recovery.
Reinhart-Rogoff recessions also leave large buildups of debt--financial sector debt, corporate debt, household debt, and public debt-in their wake. Some private debts get extinguished by default-which, of course, reduces someone else's wealth and is another reason for a slow recovery.
Reinhart and Rogoff emphasize the sharp buildup of public debt from, e.g., the bank bailout and the recession, which may (depending on the country and the circumstances) drive up interest rates, limit or end the ability to use fiscal stimulus, turn fiscal policy procyclical, or even threaten sovereign default. If fiscal expansion is blocked by a large public debt, and monetary expansion is blocked by zero interest rates, recovery from a Reinhart-Rogoff recession (unlike a Keynesian recession) may require debtreducing policies such as explicit debt forgiveness or implicit repudiation through inflation. Not your father's recovery policies.
Lesson # 4: Self-regulation is oxymoronic.
I mean this both literally and figuratively. "Self-regulating organization" is a legal term under U.S.
law; it's a private (but presumably public-spirited) institution (e.g., FINRA, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) to which a government regulatory agency (e.g., the SEC) delegates authority for detailed rulemaking and enforcement. 11 At its best, such delegation brings great technical expertise and perhaps even insiders' knowledge to bear on issues. At its worst, SROs can resemble foxes guarding chicken coops. Where was FINRA, you might ask, when the Wall Street shenanigans of the mid-2000s 10 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) make no mention of Minsky, which seems odd--unless you've paid attention to modern macroeconomics. 11 Notably, FINRA was created by a merger of two other SROs: the regulatory and enforcement arms of the NYSE and the NASD.
were going on? (Where, indeed, was the SEC?) I have long been skeptical of SROs due to their inherent conflicts of interest. That skepticism was deepened by the events leading up to the crisis.
But the oxymoron is also metaphoric. Alan Greenspan, as close to a laissez-faire Randian as you are ever likely to find in a key regulatory position, famously expressed "shocked disbelief" that the leaders of top financial firms could have been so cavalier about their risk management systems. 12 After all, their firms' lives were at stake-not to mention their own personal wealth. Presumably, in their minds, "it" couldn't happen here. Not with all those Masters of the Universe running around the place. Not with all that money pouring in the doors.
The lessons here are painfully simple. Regulators must regulate, not delegate. Financial firms must upgrade their risk management systems and have them examined by regulators. We didn't know this beforehand?
Lesson # 5: Fraud and near-fraud can rise to attain macroeconomic significance.
Economists, like other people, have always known there are crooks and tricksters on the loose, preying on the innocent and gullible. Nations have never relied on self-regulation to control con artists.
Instead, we have watchdog agencies like the SEC and law enforcement. Fraud is a legal term, and it's hard to prove. What I call "near-fraud" is a moral term, and near-frauds were rife in the booming US mortgage market of [2004] [2005] [2006] . All this was bad, but I think most of us thought that fraud and near-fraud were in the rounding error-not something that could have consequences on a macroeconomic scale.
We were wrong. A veritable epidemic of deception in the home mortgage market, especially in the subprime part, helped fuel the housing bubble, as disgracefully bad mortgages pumped up the demand for, especially, low-and medium-priced houses. 13 Wall Street then turned these awful mortgages into horrible securities (MBS, CDOs,...), many of which were then blessed with triple-A ratings by the rating agencies.
Derivative bets on these dodgy securities, some of which were apparently designed to be shorted, added to the unsavory mix.
12 See Andrews (2008) . 13 Gary Gorton (2010) , who saw things up close and personal as a consultant to AIG, has referred to mortgages that were "designed to default."
As I said, fraud is a criminal act and hard to prove. Foolish decisions and honest mistakes are not criminal. But the unhealthy blend of dodgy mortgages, risky securities, and complex "over the counter" (OTC) derivatives was laced with near-frauds. And, to the point of this lesson, there was so much of it that, when the house of cards finally crumbled, the whole economy shook. Who knew?
Lesson # 6: Excessive complexity is not just anti-competitive, it's dangerous.
I slipped the word "complex" into that last paragraph for a reason. Homimes economici never worry about complexity; they are efficient, dispassionate, rational calculating machines. Homo sapiens are an entirely different breed, however. We are subject to fads and fancies-and passions. Our "calculations"
are biased by many systematic errors. 14 When we buy financial instruments, we can be (and are!) fooled.
So, in particular, extreme complexity can translate into less effective competition by impairing the ability of buyers of financial instruments to do comparative shopping for the best price (or other terms). In the context of the crisis, I am thinking especially about customized OTC derivatives. If you ask your broker to buy a call option on Google stock at a strike price of $1,100, the market price of the option is a matter of public record and the broker's margin will be thin. But if you ask him to arrange a swap of orange juice for jet fuel in the future, getting a comparable competing quote from another broker may be next to impossible. Profit margins on such unique trades may be extremely high.
That's bad enough. But the greater hazard may come from opacity. When investors don't understand the risks that inhere in the securities they buy (examples: the mezzanine tranche of a CDO-squared; a CDS on a synthetic CDO,...), big mistakes can be made--especially if rating agencies tell you they are triple-A, to wit, safe enough for grandma. When the crash comes, losses may therefore be much larger than investors dreamed imaginable. Markets may dry up as no one knows what these securities are really worth. Panic may set in. Thus complexity per se is a source of risk.
Lesson # 7: Go-for-broke incentives will induce traders to go for broke.
We had to learn this? Apparently so.
14 This idea is central to the field of behavioral economics.
In the years prior to the crisis, banks, investment banks, and hedge funds often compensated their traders in ways that offered fabulous riches for success but comparative slaps on the wrist for failure. That compensation system created huge incentives to take huge risks; it was "heads I win a fortune, tails I lose a comparative pittance." To make the dangerous brew even worse, many traders were smart, young, and risk-loving-not to mention avaricious. Given go-for-broke incentives, they eagerly (and rationally) went for broke. While the boom lasted, successful traders became rich as Croesus. But when the bust came, the traders themselves bore little of the losses; the rest of us bore the brunt.
The skewed nature of the incentives and their possible downsides should have been obvious to anyone who paused to think about them. Apparently, few people did. I remember vividly a conversation on this topic with a famous principal of a hedge fund (who shall remain nameless) in the 1990s. I asked why his company offered its traders such crazy incentives. He understood the issue perfectly, and replied, "because everyone else does it." That sent a shiver up my spine.
The good news is that compensation practices have changed quite a lot since the crisis. I hope those changes are permanent. But, like Minsky, I worry about what happens as people forget.
Lesson # 8: Illiquidity closely resembles insolvency.
We are accustomed to thinking about-and teaching-the sharp distinction between illiquidity (experiencing a cash squeeze) and insolvency (having negative net worth). If you're a household or a business, illiquidity is a (mild or severe) flu. A truckload of borrowed cash (nowadays, figuratively) will probably get you over it--and probably quickly. Just ask Walter Bagehot. But insolvency is fatal; you are headed to bankruptcy court. Not only are the nature and severity of the two financial ailments different, so are the classic remedies. As just noted, illiquidity calls for a cash infusion. Insolvency calls for liquidation.
But is the distinction really so clear in practice, especially in a crisis? Conceptually, the two notions are different, for sure. But I think we've learned recently that, practically, they may not be, especially in a panic. Rumors (not to mention facts) that a financial institution might have suffered large losses (and hence be in danger of insolvency) can create a liquidity squeeze by precipitating a run. In the other direction, a run on a bank (or on a money market mutual fund for that matter) with positive net worth can destroy the institution unless someone comes to the rescue. If no such rescuer is on hand (and the time frame may be short), the firm may be forced to raise cash via fire sales of "good assets." 15 Such fire sales fetch low prices, which can turn positive net worth into negative net worth. Thus illiquidity can lead to insolvency.
The starkly different decisions made by the Fed and the Treasury in the Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers cases illustrate both the importance of the distinction and why it is hard to make during a crisis.
Bear Stearns was bleeding cash in March 2008, owing largely to rumors (based on facts!) of large losses in its mortgage businesses. In the fateful days before its shotgun marriage to J.P. Morgan Chase,
Bear was about to run out of cash. Had that happened, the firm was dead, just as if it had gone bankrupt.
But the Fed prevented that from happening-first with a loan, and then by arranging for J.P. Morgan to absorb Bear (at a fire-sale price, by the way). To make the sale work, the Fed had to take almost $30 Regardless of where you come down on the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers decisions, I think the two cases, viewed as a pair, deal a fatal blow to the sharp distinction between illiquidity and insolvency.
Here's one thing we can stop teaching our students!
Lesson # 9: Moral hazard isn't a show-stopper, it's a tradeoff.
The moral hazard issue has been around a long time. It's not like we just learned about it during the last crisis. But, while this lesson remains extremely controversial, I believe we learned (at least) two important things.
First, I believe we must stop viewing moral hazard as a constraint and start viewing it as part of a tradeoff. The mere fact that some policy creates moral hazard is not a reason to reject it out of hand; maybe it accomplishes some other good things. To be sure, creating or exacerbating moral hazard should count as a cost. But we must also inquire about the benefits. One well-known example is deposit insurance, which clearly creates some moral hazard but also prevents bank runs. So we accept it, albeit with limits. 16 The financial crisis provided several examples of "bailouts" in which it seemed sensible to swallow some moral hazard in order to prevent or limit a financial catastrophe (e.g., Bear Stearns, AIG, and others).
Second, timing matters. Features of a financial system that either create or limit moral hazard are mainly long-run, design issues-such as the parameters of and conditions on deposit insurance, the DoddFrank requirement for "living wills," or Dodd-Frank's "orderly liquidation authority." As just noted, such design decisions should balance moral hazard costs against the gains from reducing runs and contagion.
But in the midst of a crisis, with the house on fire, it may be imperative to douse the fire first and try to persuade the occupant not to smoke later-time inconsistency notwithstanding. Yes, bailouts set bad 16 During the crisis, the US considered, but rejected, the idea of applying 100% deposit insurance to all bank deposits-maybe to all bank liabilities, as Ireland had done.
precedents, but letting a crisis spin out of control may be far worse. We can revisit the moral hazard problem later, with new laws or regulations. 17 As Scarlett O'Hara famously put it, "I can't think about that right now... I'll think about that tomorrow."
Lesson # 10: Economic illiteracy can really hurt.
While I would not underestimate the power of wishful thinking (Lesson # 2), rampant financial illiteracy was a key enabler of the frauds and near-frauds discussed in Lesson # 5. People who do not understand compound interest, amortization, or the reset on an adjustable-rate mortgage can too easily be persuaded to sign up for mortgages they cannot afford. And they were. And it hurt.
But the damages traceable to economic illiteracy, a broader concept than financial illiteracy, went even further. Indeed, I have come to believe that economic illiteracy may be the single biggest impediment to sound national economic policy-certainly bigger than any inadequacies in economic science (though there are many) and maybe even bigger than political lobbying (though that one is a close call). Here are a few examples from the policy responses to the crisis:
• Political fur flew when the Obama administration proposed a large fiscal stimulus, roughly at the low point of the worst recession since the 1930s. Obviously, even the simplest Keynesian ideas, now almost 80 years old, are not understood by the body politic.
• Misconceptions are rife in the debate over the budget deficit. People don't understand the natural cyclicality of the deficit, the foolishness of trying to fight that cyclicality, the difference between policies that raise or lower the deficit temporarily versus permanently, and certainly not the notion that it's natural to have some deficit in a growing economy.
• As mentioned earlier, most people do not understand how or why the Federal Reserve "creates money," what that means, or how the Fed does it. In fact, most Americans don't understand the Fed at all.
It's easy to get economists to agree that economic literacy is rampant and that reducing it is important. But nominating it as "the single biggest impediment to sound national economic policy" sets a high bar. Why do I claim that? Because economic illiteracy virtually destroys what should be one of democracy's most important balance wheels. Politicians who advocate and/or promulgate nonsense should pay a price at the polls. That's how electoral Darwinism is supposed to lead-slowly and grudgingly-to better policies over time. But if voters can't tell good sense from nonsense or, worse yet, support the nonsense, this equilibrating mechanism won't work. In such a world-which regrettably resembles our own--politicians who spout nonsense pay no price at the polls.
Some lessons for teaching economics
The importance of combating economic illiteracy is a perfect segue to the last section of this paper:
How should the crisis change the way we teach economics to college students? A logical place to start is with the abysmal understanding of rudimentary Keynesian economics.
Lesson # 1: We need to teach basic Keynesian economics better.
While there are certainly exceptions, I think it is fair to say that most teachers of macro principles teach their students the basics of Keynesian economics. We've been doing that since Samuelson's first edition (1948), a time span that now covers two to three generations. Yet the message clearly has not gotten through to the public. How else can you explain House Speaker John Boehner getting away with repeatedly referring to "job-killing government spending," which became a kind of mantra for him in the I am not talking about subtleties here. It's not important that the public understand the intellectual debates that figure prominently in advanced macro classes-not to mention the arcania that fill graduate curricula. I mean very basic notions such as that the government spending multiplier is positive, at least when there is high unemployment. If mass public opinion understood at least that, Mr. Boehner could not have gotten away with claiming that more government spending somehow "kills jobs." (How is that supposed to happen?) Now, I realize that college (and even high school) economics teachers are not responsible for mass public opinion. But more than half of U.S. adults have been to college, and many took at least one economics course while they were there. Students who take just one biology course absorb the basic principles of Darwinism. (Well, most of them do.) Why, then, don't more students come away from college with a rudimentary understanding of Keynesian economics? At least part of the blame must fall on our shoulders.
One reason, I believe, for this massive pedagogical failure is mixing up economics with politics. For not very good reasons, the label "Keynesian" has gotten associated with liberalism in modern America, leading many conservatives to shun the doctrine-and the stabilizing fiscal policy that goes with it. This misconception is something we should be able to "teach out" of our students. Start with financial complexity. There is a lot of it; it played a significant role in making the crisis much worse than it needed to be; and it's clear than even the principles course must now include more material on banking and the financial system than in the past. But how much more? I am fond of quoting the Einsteinian wisdom that says that everything should be made as simple as possible-but not more so.
The question is: Where do you draw the line?
The answer is not obvious. In the context of the financial crisis, I think it is essential that students at least hear about MBS-and certainly, as just noted, learn about leverage. But I don't think they need any exposure to the mezzanine tranches of CDOs. But what about the notion of "tranching" at all? (Without that, it is hard to understand the harm done by the rating agencies.) Or credit default swaps? (There goes the AIG saga.) These gray areas are definitely gray; there are many of them; and they all require judgment calls.
For myself, as a principles teacher, I tend to draw the line tightly, including as few of the gory financial details as I can. But I can well understand why other teachers might want to cover more.
Lesson # 7: Systemic risk, too big to fail, and moral hazard?
I have saved the hardest for last: What should be said about the interrelated issues of systemic risk, too big to fail, and moral hazard? These are serious and important issues, to be sure--and relevant to policy debates, too. There simply must be a place for them in more advanced courses in banking, finance, and macroeconomics. But what about in the principles course? There, I have my doubts.
To begin with, there is no agreed-upon definition of systemic risk-and certainly no standard measurements. Second, economics seems to be miles away from anything resembling a consensus on how to deal with too-big-to-fail institutions-or even if there should be any such thing. Third, even the basic notion that there is a tradeoff between the costs of moral hazard and the benefits of reducing systemic risk-something I keenly believe--is far from being a part of the accepted catechism. All of this (and more) says to me that the issues are not yet "ready" for inclusion in the principles course which, in my view, should concentrate on received wisdom as much as possible. But I can see why some instructors might reach a different judgment.
Conclusion
We economists have learned quite a lot from the financial crisis, the Great Recession that followed it, and the pathetic recovery we've had since. Some of this material needs to seep into our curricula, including at the principles level. But as we grapple with what to add, we must be mindful of both Einstein's dictum-everything should be made as simple as possible, but not more so-and the law of conservation of teaching weeks: We don't have any more than we used to.
